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Ahsiraci - This study reports esperimental market
power and efficiency outcomes for a computational
wholesale electricity market operating In the short run
under systematically varied concentration and
capacity conditions. The pricing of electricity is
determined by means of a clearinghouse double
auction with discriminator}- midpoint pricing. Buyers
and sellers use a modified Roth-Erev individual
reinforcement learning algorithm to determine their
price and quantity offers in each auction round. It is
shown that high market efficiency is generally
attained, and that market microstructure is strongly
predictive for the relative market power of buyers and
sellers independently of the values set for the
reinforcement learning parameters. Results are
briefly compared against results from an eariier study
in which buyers and sellers instead engage in social
mimicry learning via genetic algorithms.
Index Terms — Wholesale electricity market,
restructuring, repeated double auction, market power,
efficiency, concentration, capacity, individual
reinforcement learning, genetic algorithm social
learning, agent-based computational economics.
1. INTRODUCTION
Any electric power industry must carry out three basic
functions, rcgaidless of its structure [1|. [2]. Inrsi, it must
produce electricity from existing capacity. Second, it
must distribute this electricit}^ to final consumers. Third,
it must engage in longer-run planning and investment for
the production of new capacit\'.
Until recently, most electricity has been supplied by
vertically integrated statutory monopolies operating either
as public utilities or as regulated investor-owned utilities
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[3.Ch. 6). The regulatory compact lias generally decreed
that utilities shouldprovide enoughgeneration capacity to
ensure an adequate supply of electricity for all users in
return for receiving a fair rate of return on their capacity .
In recent years, however, this regulatory compact has
been widely eroded due to the growing iirationalitv- of the
rate structure and the public perception that current
industry' practices fail to provide the proper incentives to
ensure market efficiency. In consequence, calls have
increasingly been made to restructure the electric power
industry into a more competitive industry in which prices
would better reflect true marginal costs. At the same
time, concerns have been expressed that restructuring
efforts might actually resuh in efficiency losses.
Moreover, equitv' concerns have arisen regarding possible
increased opportunities for some market participants to
exercise mciiicet power, i.e.. to secure a higher share of
profits for themselves than would be possible under
competitivemarket conditions 14].
To date, restructuring proposals for the electric power
industiy have focused primarily on the wholesale
electricity market In this market, electricity is produced
by generating companies ("generators") from existing
capacity and sold either to other generators or to some
form of energ>' service provider. The energy service
providers subsequently resell the electricity to household.
mdustr>', or conunercial users in a retail market
Short-run production efficiency in a wholesale
electricity market requires that current demand be met
using tlie least-costly mix of existing capacity. Any
market mechanism proposed for the short-run efficient
determination of trades in a wholesale electricity market
must therefore address four tasks (1. pp. 11-12]. First the
buyers and sellers who would benefit from trade must be
identified. Second, these buyers and sellers must be
matchcd so as to maximize total gains to trade. Third, a
specific price and quantity level must be determined for
each matched buyer-seller pair. Fourth, trades between
matched buyers and sellers must be carried out within the
constraints of the electric power transmission grid.
One market mechanism currently under intense
consideration for wholesale electricity markets in many
parts of the world is a clearinghouse double auction (5)-
[7]. In such an auction, wholesale buyers and sellers of
electricity participate repeatedly in auction rounds. At the
beginning of each auction round the buyers and sellers
submit price and quantity offers simultaneously to a
clearinghouse. At the end of each auction round the
clearinghouse matches the price and quantity offers
received during the round in accordance with publicly
known protocols, subject to transmission grid constraints,
and reports these matches back to the buyers and sellers.
The prices set by the clearinghouse are either
discriminatory (set individually for each matched buyer-
seller pair) or uniform (set equal across all matched
buyer-seller pairs). The practic^ advantage of such an
auction mechanism is that its trading and settlement rules
do not require the clearinghouse to know in advance the
number of participants, their private costs, or their
privately held beliefs and preferences.
Ideally, the performance of any proposed auction
mechanism shodd be understood prior to its actual
implementation. The difficulty for wholesale electricity
markets is that these markets generally comprise small
numbers of buyers and sellers with differentiated costs
and capacities •who interact repeatedly over time. The
buyers and sellers may thus have an incentive to "game"
an auction mechanism, i.e., to behave opportunistically
within the limits set by the auction protocol in an attempt
to increase their individual gains to trade. In particular,
buyers and sellers may have an incentive to submit price
offers that misrepresent tlieir true willingness to pay or
their true marginal costs and to submit quantity offers that
misrepresent their true capacities.
For example, it is well known that "implicit collusion"
problems can arise in uniform-price auctions for multiple
umts of a homogeneous good such as electricity [8], [9].
In uniform-price auctions, the marginally inatched buyer
and seller determine the price for every unit, and auction
participants may be able to collude tacitly to move this
price in their favor. Klemperer notes [9, p. 4] that it was
partly to avoid such problems that electricity regulators in
the U.K. recently proposed a set of New Electricity
Trading Arrangements (NETA) for the U.K. Under these
arrangements, an exchange mariiet followed by a
discriminatory-price auction would replace the existing
uniform-price auction.
Implicit collusion is more difficult in discriminatoiy-
price auctions. Nevertheless, auction participants may
still have an incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior
\vith regard to their price and quantity offers. Moreover,
as found by Bower and Bunn [10] in the context of a one
sided auction for electricity generators, a discriminatory
auction may permit large generators with many
generating plants to have informational advantages over
smaller generators.
Consequently, while it is highly desirable to predict in
advance the market power and efficiency implications of
proposed new auction protocols for wholesale electricity
markets, the complexity of these markets makes it
difficult to do so using standard analytical tools or
human-subject laboratory experiments., Empirical stud)-
is also difficult since relevant data is scarce. This
suggests a potentially useful role for computational
experiments.
This study constructs an agent-based computational
model of a wholesale electricity market that can be used
as a laboratory for systematic experimentation." We use
this laboratory to investigate market power and efficiency
outcomes for a short-run wholesale electricity market
with double- auction pricing and with bityers and sellers
who continually update their price offers on the basis of
past profit experiences. We consider how the relative
market power of the buyers and sellers varies in response
to changes in concentration and capacity when auction
prices are determine by means of a discriminator^'
pricing rule. We also consider the implications of this
discriminatory pricing rule for short-run market
efficiency.
One special concern of this study is the development
of conceptual tools that permit market power effects due
to market structure to be distinguished from marfcet power
effects due to buyer and seller learning. We focus
particularly on the degree to wliich the discriminatory
pricing rule induces structural versus behavioral market
power effects.
Another special concern of this study is the testing of
an empirically based representation for individual
learning. Our electricity buyers and sellers are assumed
to leam in accordance with a modified version^ of a
reinforcement learning algorithm developed by Roth and
' As discussed in [7] and [11]-[13], researchers studying
auctions by means of analytical tools and human-subject
laboratory experiments have focused largely on simpler
auction contexts in which the scope for opportunistic
behavior is limited, e.g., single-round single-unit auctions
in which the participants have extensive common
knowledge. Rust et al. [14] is an important exception.
Otlier researchers who have undertaken agent-based
computational studies of wholesale electricity markets
with double-auction pricing include [6] and [15], Various
resources on agent-based computational economics
(ACE) in general, including surveys, an annotated
syllabus of readings, software, and pointers to individual
researchers and research groups, can be found at the ACE
Web site at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htni.
^ In preliminary versions of this study (ISU Economic
Report No. 52, August 2000, revised Februaiy 2001), it is
stated that the origiilal Roth-Erev algorithm is used. It
was subsequently determined, however, that the code
implementation actually included a "small" modification
of this learning algorithm. As will be clarified below, the
resulting modified learning algorithm turns out to have
important advantages over the original Roth-Erev learning
algorithm in the current double-auction setting.
Erev [16],[171. The attractiveness of the Roth-Erev
learning algorithm is that its form embodies the most
salient regularities observed in the decision-making
behavior of human subjects across a wide v^ety of
multiagentexperimehtalgames
Ourmain experimental finding is that structural biases
are inherent in iscriminatbry pricing niles and that these
biases are highly predictive for relative maricet power
outcomes. Althou^ high market efficiency is generally
attained, the buyers or sellers who are less favored in
terms of market power under the discriminatory pricing
rule are notable to overcome this structu^ market power
bias through learning. This is the case even though the
less favored agents have the potential to gain positive
market power through appropriate strategic pricing. The
symmetric nature of the double auction, which requires
both sides of the market to submit price offers
simultaneously, appearsto preventeitherbuyers or sellers
from successfully learning to gain a relativemarket power
advantage through strategic price offers.
Section II presents our computational electricity
market framework, including a detailed description of the
auction mechanism, the learning algorithm used by
traders to determine their price offers, and the calculation
of benchmark competitive market outcomes. In Section
III we explain the experimental design of our study in
terms of both tested hypotheses and tested -parameter
values. Section IV reports our basic experimental
findings, and Section V provides a detailed discussion of
these findings. The concluding Section VI summarizes
our key findings and discusses the relationship of these
findings to work by other authors, in particular the work
by Gode and Sunder [18] on the relative efficiency effects
of market structure versus learned behavior.
II. ELECTRICITYMARKET FRAMEWORK
A. Overview
Our computational electricity maricet incorporates
several features anticipated to be key aspects of short-run
wholesale electricity markets operating under
restructuring. Small numbers of •buyers and ' sellers
submit price offers repeatedly to a clearinghouse double
auction in an attempt to maximize their profits. The
buyers and sellers have multi-unit capacities and
differentiated revenues and costs, private information that
other traders cannot observe directly. • Moreover, each
buyer and seller continuously updates its price offers on
the basis of its past profit experiences in a manner that
permits the exploitation of profit opportunities arising
from the pricing behavior of other traders.
More precisely, our computational electricity market
models the short-run wholesale trading of electricity by
traders attached to an electric power transmission grid.
The transmission grid is a fully connected graph with
traders as the nodes and transmission lines as. the edges.
Each trader is assigned a maximum amount of electricity
{capacity) that it canbuy or sell in eachauction round as
well as a certain available transmission capability (ATC)
with respect to eachother trader. Traders with electricity
to buy are referred to as buyers, and traders with
electricity to sell are referred to as sellers.
The following parameter values are specified for each
buyer; capacity in MWh; (constant) marginal revenue per
MWh purchased and resold in a secondary retail market;
and fixed costs. Also, the following parameter values are
specified for'each, seller; capacity, in MWh; (constant)
marginal costperMWh generated; andfixed costs. These
parameter values are private to eachtrader.
' The buyers and sellers trade electricity repeatedly in
a discriminatoiy-price double auction nm by an
independent clearinghouse, henceforth referred to as a
discriminatory auction.The goal of each buyerand seller
is to maximize its own profits.
The discriminatory auction is performed in roimds. In
each.round-the bikers and sellers simultaneously submit
bids (ofiers to buy) and asks (offers to sell) to the
clearinghouse. Each, bid and ask .consists of a single
price-quantity pair. Thelinearity assumed for the traders'
revenue and cost functions, together with the
discriminatoiy'auction protocol, ensures that the profit-
maximizing quantity offered by each trader is simply its
capacity quantity. As detailed more fully in Section II.B,
the clearinghousematches these bids and asks, usingas its
criterion the maximization of total profit, and
communicates these matches back to the buyers and
sellers.
At the end of the auction round, the matched buyers
and sellers carry out their assigned trades and record their
profit outcomes. They then use these profit outcomes to
determine their price offers for the next auction round.
B. Auction RoundImplementation
A single auction round proceeds as follows. First,
each trader selects a feasible price offer in accordance
with the trader's cuitent "choice probabilities" — the
determination of these choice probabilities is explained in
Section lI.E. Each trader submits this price offer to the
clearinghouse along with a quantity offer equal to the
trader's capacity.^ The clearinghouse then separately
sorts the buyers and sellers by their.price offers in
descending andascending order, respectively.^
Recall from Section II.A that the profit-maximizing
quantity offer for each trader in each auction round is
simply its capacity qu^tity.
^Before each (bubble) sort, the ordering of the traders is
randomized to avoid unintended incumbency effects in
cases where'Some buyers or sellers make identical price
offers.
The buyer with the highest bid price is first matched
witli the seller with the lowest ask price. The unit price
for the contract is set at the midpoint of the bid-ask
spread. If there is nonzero available transmission
capability (ATC) between the buyer and the seller, then
the buyer is matched with the seller for an amount of
electricity calculated as the minimum of three amounts:
the ATC; the capacity of the buyer; and the capacity of
the seller. Thus, if the ATC is 5 MWh, the buyer's
capacity is 10 MWh, and the seller's capacity is 20 MWh,
then the contract is made for 5 MWh because this is the
maximum quantity that the power grid can support. The
carryoveramount to buy or sell is then calculated, and the
next pair is matched in similar fashion.
Table I gives an example of a matching outcome for a
market comprising tlu^ee buyers and threesellers in which
the ATC between any paired buyer and seller is assimied
to be 10 MWh.
TABLE I
BUYER-SELLER MATCHING ILLUSTRATION
Sellers Buyers
$4/20 MWh; $9/10 MWh
$5 / 10 MWh; $8 / 10 MWh
$6/10 MWh; $7/10 MWh
Matches: (1-1) for 10 MWh at Unit Price $7/MWh;
(1-2) for 10MWh at Unit Price $6/MWh;
(2-3) for 10MWh at Unit Price $6/MWh;
Seller 3 Not Matched.
At the end of the auction round, each trader
implements its auction-assigned trades and obtains a
profit outcome. Each trader then uses this profit outcome
to calculate updated choice probabilities for selecting
among its feasible price offers in the next auction round.
This updating is accomplished by means of a modified
version of a reinforcement learning algorithm developed
by Roth and Erev [16], [17]. The latter algorithm will be
motivated and illustrated prior to introducing the modified
version.
C.Motivationfor the Roth-Erev Algorithm
In a series of studies. Roth and Erev [16], [17] have
sought to understand how people leam individually to
behave in games with multiple strategically-interacting
players. To this end, they have developed a three-
parameter reinforcement learning algorithm, hereafter
referred to as thei?£" algorithm.
The basic intuition underlying any reinforcement
learning algorithm is that the tendency to implement an
action should be strengthened (reinforced) if it produces
favorable results and weakened if it produces unfavorable
results [19]. Roth and Erev take this law of effect
principle, widely accepted in the psychological learning
literatxu-e, as the basic starting point in their search for a
robust model of individual learning. In addition, the}'
argue for an additional learning principle, also adhered to
widely in the psychological learning literature, which they
refer to as the power law ofpractice. The latter principle
asserts that learning curves tend to be initially steep, after
wliich they flatten out.
Psychologists generally have focused on individual
learning in "games against nature" for which there is only
one decision-maker. In contrast. Roth and Erev are
interested in individual learning in strategic environments
with multiple decision-makers. Roth and Erev argue that,
in such contexts, the law of effect and the power law of
practice fail to account sufficiently for the observed
responsiveness of decision-makers to other decision-
makers in their choice environments.
Based on extensive observations of individual learning
in multiagent games, Roth and Erev argue for two
additional learning principles that help to capture learning
responsiveness, wWch they refer to as experimentation
and the recency (or forgetting) effect. The former
principle asserts that, not only are choices that were
successftil in the past more likely to be employed in the
ftiture, but similar choices will be employed more often as
well. The latter principle asserts that recent experience
generally plays a larger role tlian past experience in
determining behavior.
The RE algorithm incorporates each of these four
learning principles to some degree. Roth ^d Erev show
that this algorithm is able to track successfully the
observed intermediate-term behavior of human subjects
over a wide variety of multiagent repeated games with
unique equilibria achievable using stage-game strategies.
D. Form ofthe Roth-Erev Algorithm
The three parameters characterizing tlie RE algorithm
are a scaling parameter s(l), a recency parameter r and
an experimentation parameter e. The implementation of
tlie RE algorithm will now be illustrated for a group of
buyers and sellers participating in a double auction. For
simplicity, each buyer and seller is assumed to leam in
accordance with an RE algorithm characterized by the
same three values for these parameters.
The feasible price offer domain for each buyer and
seller is approximated by a discrete grid consisting of K
feasible actions (bid or ask prices) k, where K is the same
for each trader. At the beginning of the fu^st auction round
1, each trader] assigns an equal propensity qji;(l) to each
of its feasible actions k, given by qjk(l)= s(l)X/K, where
X is the average profit that buyers and sellers can achieve
in any given auction round.
Moreover, each trader j assigns an equal choice
probability pjk(l) to each of its feasible actions k, given
by Pjk(l) = 1/K. Each trader j then probabilistically
selects a feasible action k' to submit to the clearinghouse
in accordance with its current choice probabilities. On the
basis of all received bids and asks, the clearinghouse
determines buyer-seller matches. It then communicates
these matches back to the traders along with a quantity
amount and a mi^oint price for eachmatch. Each trader
j thenimplements its assigned trades and records the total
profits RO,k',l) that it gained fromthis trading activity.
Now suppose that trader j is at the end of the nth
auction round, for arbitrary positive n, and that in the nth
auction roundtraderj has submitteda feasible actionk' to
theclearinghouse andachieved total profits R(j,k',n) fi-om
its resulting auction-directed trading activity.' Trader j
then updates its existing action propensities q,-k(n) on the
basis of its newly earned profits, as follows. Given any
feasible action k, thepropensity qjk(n+l) for choosing k in
the next auction round n+1 is determined as
(n+1) = (1 - r)q^^ (n) +E{j,k, k\n,K,e)
where r denotes the value of the recency parameter, e
denotes the value of the experimentation parameter, and
E(*) is an update function reflecting the experience gained
from past trading activity.
The recency parameter r slowly reduces the
importance of past experience, thus implementing the
recency effect. The update function E(-) takes the form
E(j,Kk\n,K,e) = e
K-\
, k^k'
The selected action k' is thus reinforced or discouraged
on the basis of the profits R(j,k',n) earned subsequent to
this selection, but some propensity to experiment among
all other feasible actions k is also retted. Thus, E(') is
an implementation of the experimentationprinciple.
Given the updated propensities qjk(n+l) for auction
round n+1, traderj's updat^ choice probabilities Pjk(n+1)
for selecting among its feasible actions k in auction round
n+1 take the form
m=l
In summary, Roth-Erev traders solve a myopic
stimulus-response problem of the following form: Given
this profit outcome, what price should I next choose?
They do not engage in any explicit look-ahead reasoning
e.g., if I choose this price now, how might this affect the
price choices ofmy rivals in the future? ; > •
E. TheModifiedRoih-ErevAlgorithm
The RE algorithm outlined in Section II.D has two
drawbacks: parameter degeneracy; and no probability
updating in response to zero profits.®
First, the updating of the choice probabilities is slow if
e is set close to [K-l]/K arid ceases entirely if e is set
equal to [K-IJ/K, Consequently, care must be taken in
specifying values for e and K.
•Second, a much more substantial difficulty in a
double-auction context is that each trader only updates its
choice probabilities in response to non-zero profit
outcomes. A zero profit outcome leavesa tradei's choice
probabilities unch^ged because each of the trader's
currentpropensity values is shrunk to the samedegree. In
a double-auction, traders must learn to make price offers
for which bids exceed asks in order for matching Qience
positive profits) to occur at all. Anabsenceof probability
updating in response to zero profits can therefore result in
a substantial loss of market efficiency as jtraders struggle
to learn how to make profitable price offers
A simple modification of the RE algorithm addresses
both of these problemswhile still maintainingconsistency
with the learning principles embodied in the original RE
algorithm. Specifically, we replace the update flmction
E(-) in the original ^ algorithm with the following
modified update fimction:
MEUXk\n,K,e) =
RO\k\n){l-el k = k^
e
K~l
k:^k'
This modification essentially introduces a
differential value for the recency parameter r for selected
versus non-selected actions- while at the same time
omitting the profit term in the updating equation for
propensities -corresponding to non-.selected actions. In
particular, the effect is to reduce the magnitude of the
recency parameter for non-selected actions from r to r* =
(r - e/IK-lJ). Clearly degeneracy no longer occurs for e =
[K-IJ/K, but how does this modification also ameliorate
the zero-profit updating problem?
Note that the shrinkage induced by [l-rj in the
propensityvalue for the selected action is now larger than
the shrinkage induced by [l-r*] in the propensity values
^Alexei Kroujiline pointed out tlie parameter degeneracy
problem to us. Deddy Koesrindartoto alerted us about the
zero-profit updating problem in a particularly compelling
way. In his own double-auction experiments with Roth-
Erev learners participating in 1000 auction rounds,
persistent market inefficiency arose for certain parameter
specifications because the choice probabilities associated
with various zero-profit (non-matching) price offers
remained at persistently positive levels.
for non-selected actions. Consider, then, what happens
whena zero-profit outcome resultsfrom a selected action
k'. AH propensities ^e shrunk, but the propensity
corresponding to k' imdergoes the most shrinkage.
Consequently, in the next auction round the choice
probabilities for the non-selected actions will increase
relative to the choice probability for k', encouraging the
trader to move away from the action that resulted in zero
profits.
On the other hand, suppose the selected action k'
results in a positive profit outcome. Then the positive
profit reinforcement in the propensity updating equation
for k' will tend to outweighthe larger shrhikageand hence
to induce a relative increase in the updated choice
probabilityfor this action in the next auction roimd.
In summary, when the update function E(') in the RE
algorithm is replaced with the modified update function
ME(-), the zero-profit updating problem is ameliorated.
The choice probabilities corresponding to action choices
resulting in zero-profit outcomes tend to decrease relative
to other choiceprobabilitieswhile the choiceprobabilities
corresponding to action choices resulting in positive-
profit outcomes tend to increase.
In the current study it will be assumed that electricity
buyers and sellers adaptively update their price offers in
accordance with this modified RE algorithm, hereafter
referred to as the MRE algorithm.
F. Competitive Equilibrium Calculation
The main objective of this study is to determine
market power and efficiency outcomes by comparing the
profits that buyers and sellers of electricity obtain in a
discriminatory auction against the profits they would
obtain under competitive equilibrium. This section
explains the meaning and calculation of competitive
equilibrium.
A competitive equilibriimi in a market for a positively
valued good is a (positive) unit price, P, a total quantity
supplied, Qs(P), and a total quantity demanded, Qd(P),
such that Qs(P) = Qd(P). That is, the total quantity
suppliedmust equal the total quantitydemanded.
The notation Qs(P) and Qd(P) indicates that these
supply and demand quantities depend on the priceP of the
good. How is this dependence determined?
The total supplyat each given price is simply the sum
of the quantities of good that each seller plans to sell at
that price. Letting qi(P) denote how much of the good
seller i plans to sell at each price P,
QsiP) = lL<iAP)
r
Similarly, the total demand at each givenprice is the siun
of the quantities of good desired by each buyer of the
good at that price. Letting qj^) denote how much,of the
goodbuyer j plans.to buy at each price P,
J
Note that the supplies and demands of the
individual sellers and buyers are represented as functions
of the market price P. This dependence comes from the
assumption that these individual supplies and demands
are the solutions of competitive profit maximization
problems, i.e., profit maximizationproblems in which the
traders are assumed to take the market price P as givea
Specifically, for the electricity model at hand, the
competitive profit ma^dmization problem for each seller i
takes the following form:
Max P-qj- Of •
ii
s.t. 0<q^ < CSj
Themarginal cost parameter aj denotes howmuchit costs
seller i to generate each MWh of electricity, and the
capacity parameter CSi denotes an upper bound on the
amount that seller i can generate in any one auction
round. The solution to this maximization problem is:
CS, ifP>a.,
[0,CS,] ifP = a,
0 if P < a.
Note that seller i is assumed to take the maiket price
P as givenandhence exogenous to its profitmaximization
problem. The assumption in the competitive model is that
the sellers believe that their quantity choices have no
effect on the market price. Consequently, if they try to
sell electricityat a price above the market price, theywill
sell nothing; buyers will buy electricity firom the sellers
with the lowest price. If they try to sell electricity at a
price below the m^ket price, they will succeed in selling
all they can generate, but they could also do so at the
market price and' make higher profit. Thus, there is no
incentive for the sellers to sell at any price other than the
market price.
Similarly, for the electricity model at hand, the
competitive profit maximization problem for eachbuyerj
takes the following form:
Max r.qj - P-qj
"ij
s.t. (i<qj < CBj
Here rj represents themarginal revenue received bybuyer
j for each MWh of electricity that buyer j resells in a
secondary retail electricity market, and CBj is an upper
bound on how much electricity buyer j can resell in any
one auction round , The solution to this profit
maximization problem is ' - - • •
0 if P > r.
qjiP)=-
[0,C5,] \iP = r.
CB, if P<r..
The buyers are assumed to believe that their quantity
choices have no effect on the market price P, so this price
is taken as an exogenous parameter in their profit
maximization problems.
P (S/MWh)
MWh
Fig. I. Competitive equilibrium for a 3-buyer 3-sellermodel.
Each traderhas the samecapacity(20MWh).
A competitive equilibrium is said to occur at any price
P that eqxiates Qs(P) and Qd(P). It is possible that
infinitely many competitive equilibria exist An example
of this is shown in Figure 1. In this case there are 3 buyers
and 3 sellers, each with a capacity of 20 MWh. The
competitive equilibrium is located where the supply and
demand functions intersect, which happens to be along
the vertical line segment labeled CE between $16/MWh
and $17/M\Vh. Eveiy point on this vertical line segment
is a competitive equilibrium. For concreteness, we
always take the competitive price to be the midpoint of all
possible competitive prices. Hence, in the current
example we would t^e the competitive price to be
$16.50/MWh, the average of the highest ^d lowest
possible competitive prices $17/MWh and $i6/M\Vh at
the competitive equilibrium quantity 40 MWh.
It is important to recognize that the buyers and sellers
in our computational electricity market do not. actually
solve the competitive profit maximization problems
presented above. Rather, these. profit maximization
problems are used as zero-market-power benchmarks
against which our e^erimental auction outcomes canbe
compared. ''
I • ' • , •
•- III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. Tested Hypotheses -
' For simplicity,' it is assumed that all buyers in the
computational electricity market are energy service
providers and all sellers ^e generators, implying that
generators do not sell'to other generators. Let Nb denote
the nimiber of buyers and let Ns denote the number of
' sellers. The relative concentration (RCON)' of the market
is then defined to be
N
RCON = ^
N.
Let CB denote the in^mum amount of electricity that
each buyercan resell in a retailmarket, and let CS denote
the maximum amount of electricity that each seller can
generate, both measured in megawatts per hour (MWh).
Then the relative capacity {RCAF) of the electricity
market is defined as;
rCAP^^
N^-CS
Let PBCE denote the profits' that buyers would
obtain in competitive equilibrium and let PBA denote the
"profits that buyers instead obtain'when prices and
quantities are determined in the discriminatory auction.
Then the market power ofbuyers {MPB) is defined as:
MPB =
PBA-PBCE
PBCE
If the buyers can exert control over the price of electricity
in the auction, i.e., if the buyers can exercise market
power, then they should be able to raise their profits
above their competitive profit level and MPB should be
positive. * • '
Similarly, let PSCE denote the' profits that sellers
would obtain in competitive equilibrium and let PSA
denote the profits that .sellers instead obtain in the
discriminatory auction. Then the marketpower ofsellers
{MPS) is defined as:
' For expositional simplicity, we refer to the net eaniings
of the buyers as profits, ignoring all further downstream
retail activities by these agents.
MPS =
PSA-PSCE
PSCE
If the sellers can exert control over the price of electricity
in the auction, i.e., if the sellers can exercise market
power, then they should be able to raise their profits
above their competitive profit level and MPS should be
positive.
The level of total profits achieved by all buyers and
sellers in the computational electricity market attains its
maximum value in competitive equilibrium, by
construction. The market power indices MPB and MPS
measure the extent to which the profit levels achieved
separately by buyers and sellers in the discriminatoiy
auction differ from the profit levels they would achieve in
competitive equilibrium. This redistribution of profits
between buyers and sellers may come at the expense of
smaller total profits for all buyers and sellers combined.
For example, suppose some injramarginal trader (i.e.,
some trader who would match in competitive equilibrium)
engages in opportunistic auction behavior, either
underbidding its true willingness to pay, or asking more
than its true marginal cost. In this case, it could happen
that an extramarginal trader (i.e., a trader who would fail
to match in competitive equilibrium) would be able to
match in the discriminatory auction by submitting a
higher bid or lower ask than the opportunistic trader,
leaving tlie latter immatched.
To check for possible inefficiencies arising under the
discriminatoiy auction, . we introduce the following
efficiency measure. The efficiency EA of the market
operating under tl\e auction protocol is defined to be the
ratio of total auction profits to total profits in competitive
equilibrium, measured in percentage terms. That is, using
previously introduced notation, we define
EA =
PBA-vPSA
PBCE^•PSCE
xlOO
We test the market power and efficiency implications
of discriminatory auction pricing for our computational
wholesale electricity market in the form of three
hypotheses.
HI) As RCAP increases, MPB decreases
yvhileMPS increases, all else equal
Intuitively, buyers should have a harder time
exercising market power when there is excess demand
capacity, i.e., when the maximum amoimt of electricity
that the buyers want to purchase exceeds the amount that
the sellers are able to generate. Thus, one might expect
the MPB maiitet power index for buyers to decrease and
the MPS market power index for sellers to increase with
increases in RCAP, all else equal.
H2)As RCONdecreases, MPB decreases while
MPS increases, all else equal
Intuitively, sellers should have an easier time
exercising market power as electricity generation
becomes concentrated in the hands of fewer sellers per
buyer. Thus, the MPB market power index for buyers
should decrease and the MPS market power index for
sellers should increase as RCON decreases, all else equal.
For example, hypothesis H2 is consistent \vith the claim
by Green and Newbery [20, p. 952] that the market power
exercised by generators in the British electricity spot
market would have been reduced substantially if the
industry had been subdivided into five generators rather
than two.
H3^Mostpotentialgains to trade are
exhausted, le., EA is close to 100percent
Any unrealizedprofitable trades are those
offering the smallestgains.
Hypothesis H3 conjectures that the level of total
profits achieved by buyers and sellers in the
discriminatoiy auction wll be close to the level of total
profits achieved under competitive equilibrium, which is
the maximum possible level. Consequently, the
conjecture is that the size of the total profit pie under the
discriminatoiy auction is essentially independent of the
division of this pie among the buyers and sellers and
hence essentially independent of any auction-induced
market power effects. Hypothesis H3 is consistent with
the high efficiency found in a wide variety of human-
subject experiments with double auctions [11].
B. TestedParameter Values
Tlie experimentally tested values for the niunbcr Nb of
buyers, the number Ns of sellers, the capacity CB of each
buyer, and the capacity CS of each seller are given in
Table II. The capacities of the buyers and sellers are
representative of typical generation and demanded loads.
The capacities for the buyers and sellers are selected to
provide the following three test ratios for the relative
capacity measure RCAP: 1:2, 1:1, and 2:1. All buyers are
assumed to have identical capacities, and similarly for all
sellers. For simplicity, in this first experimental study the
available transmission capability (ATC) between each
buyer and seller is set at 100 MWTi to ensure that the ATC
is not a binding constraint on any buyer-seller match
under these capacity specifications. ®
®As stressed byAlvarado [21], determining the effects of
ATC constraints on maricet power is a subtle issue, since
ATC constraints make it more likely that congestion can
be induced strategically for market power advantages.
This topic will be taken up in future studies.
TABLEU
TESTED PARAMETER VALUES
1/2
RCAP
1 2
2 Ns=6
Nb=3
CS=10
CB=10
Ns=6 .
Nb=3
CS=10
CB=20,
Ns=6
Nb)=3 -
CS=10
CB = 40
RCON
1
Ns=3 •
Nb=3
CS = 20
CB=10
Ns-3 '
Nb=3 .
CS=10
.CB=10.
Ns=3 .
Nb=3
CS=10
CB=20 '
1/2 Ns=3
Nb=6
CS = 40
CB=10
Ns=3 •
Nb=6
CS = 20
CB=10
Ns=3
Nb=6
CS=10
CB=10
Buyers and sellers are assumed to have linear revenue
and cost functions subject to capacity constraints, so that
their marginal revenues and margjiial costs are constant
over their quantity choices up to capacity. The cost
functions specified for the sellers are scaled linear
approximations of the cost fimctions of actual generating
units.
Table III shows the specification for marginal revenue
(marginal cost) for each buyer (seller) in the experiments
reported below. The fixed costs of the buyers and sellers
are set to zero for a simpler model. For a seller, this could
be representative of a generator already up and running
(i.e., synchronized to the transmission grid) and waiting
for a match in the auction to connect to the system and
deliver electricity.
The marginal costs of the sellers are chosen to cover
three types of operating costs: expensive, medium, and
cheap. These three types might be representative of an
older generationunit, an older unit that has been updated,
and a new unit, or of different types of fuel usage. Note
from Table-III that, when all six sellers are simulated, two
of each type are included to model the competition
between similar companies. The buyers' marginal
revenues are similar to the marginal costs of the sellers
but with enough of a difference to keep a competitive
equilibrium profit. This assures the existence of a
competitive equilibriimi price, which is then used to
calculate the benchmark profit levels for maiket power
and efficiency.
Buyers and sellers are not permitted to submit bid or
ask prices to the auction that would definitely result in
negativeprofits if accepted. To implement this rationality
postulate, the set of feasible bid price offers for each
buyer is specified to be the interval [MR-$40/MWh, MR],
where MR denotes the buyer's true (constant) marginal
revenue. Also, the set of feasible ask price offers for each
seller is specified to be interval [MC, MC+$40/MWh],
where MC denotes the seller's true (constant) marginal
cost. The lower bound MR-$40/MWh is low enough to
encompassall possible £^kprices by sellers, and the upper
bound MC+$40/MWh is high enough to encompass all
possible bid prices by buyers.
TABLE m
LINEAR REVENUE AND COST CURVES
Buyers Marginal Revenue
1 . $37/MWh
• 2 $17/MWh
3 " $12/MWh
4 $37/MWh
• 5 $17/MWh
6 $12/MWh
Sellers Marginal Cost
1 $35/MWh
2 $16/MWh
3 Sll/Mwh
4 S35/MWh
5 $16/MWh
6 Sll/MWh
To check the sensitivity of the maiket power and
efficiency outcomes to/the specific values set for the
parameters characterizing the MRE reinforcement
learning algorithm, the nine RCAP/RCON configurations
in Table 11 are tested three times using three different
settings for these parameter values
Recall from Section n.E that the MRE algorithm is
characterized by three, parameters: a scaling parameter
s(l), a recency parameter r, and an experimentation
parametere. Erev and Roth [18, pi 864] note that a good
fit to their experimental data covering twelve distinct
types of human-subject games was obtained for all values
of these parameters lying in the following ranges: 0 < s(l)
< lO'OO; 0 < r < 0.20;"and 0.02 < e < 0.30.
In the first two tests for Table 11 reported below, the
parameter values for the MRE algorithm are calibrated to
facilitate the emergence for each trader of a dominant
price offer with a relatively large choice probability by
the final auction round in each run. In the first test each
nm consists of 1000 auction rounds, and in Ae second test
each nm consists of 10,000 auction rounds.The parameter
calibration was accomplished in two stages, as follows.
First, given the number of auction rounds per run, the
density of the price offers within each trader's feasible
priceoffer rangewas specified to help ensure an adequate
sampling frequency for each possible offer. For the 1000
auction rounds per.nm case, K=30 possible price offers
were randomly selected wit^ each feasible price offer
range, implying that each trader could in principle sample
each price 33 times during each run. The average profit X
achievable in any auction round for this case was set at
X=15,000. For the 10,000 auction rounds per run case,
K=100 possible price offers were randomly selected
within each feasible price offer range, implying that each
trader could in principle sample each price 100 times
during the course of each run. A value X=50,000 was set
for this case.
Second, by direct search, the values for the three MRE
algorithm parameters s(l), r, and e were calibrated until
the bid or ask price histogram for each of the traders
became single peaked by the final auction round in each
run. The calibrated parameter values found for the 1000
auction round case were s(l)=1.00, r=0.04, and e=0.97.
Tlie calibrated parameter values found for the 10,000
auction round case were s(l)=1.00, r=0.02, and e=0.99.®
For both cases, the calibrated values for s(l) and r fall
within the Erev-Roth good fit ranges presented above
whereas the cahbrated values for e do not.
In the third test for Table II, the scaling parameter s(l),
tlie recency parameter r, and the experimentation
parameter e for the MRE algorithm are instead set equal
to the values obtained by Erev and Roth [18, p. 8631 by a
best overall fit of the RE algorithm to experimental data
from twelve distinct types of games run with human
subjects. These values are s(l)=9.00, r=0.10, and e=0.20.
The MRE algorithm with the latter parameter values is
referred to below as the best-fitMRE algorithm.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Tables IV-VI report aggregate and individual maiket
power outcomes and efficiency outcomes for the three
distinct learning specifications outlined in Section III.B.
Specifically, in the first learning specification, each trader
is assumedto use the calibratedMRE algorithmwith each
run consisting of 1000 auction rounds. In the second
learning specification, each trader is assumed to use the
calibrated MRE algorithm with each run consisting of
10,000auction rounds. In the third leammg specification,
each trader is assumed to use the best-fit MR£ algorithm
with each ran consisting of 1000 auction rounds.
— Insert Tables IV, V, and VI About Here —
Each cell in each table corresponds to a unique
RCAP/RCON configuration, in parallel to Table II. For
each table cell, the auction was run 100 times using 100
different seeds for the pseudo-random number generator.
It is interesting to note that, under the original RE
algorithm, no updating of choice probabilities would
occur for this 10,000 auction round case since e = [K-ll/K
= 0.99. In contrast, as will be seen below, the MRE
algorithm results in good learning and very high market
efficiency.
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For each run, the profit levels attained in the final auction
round by buyers as a whole and by sellers as a whole, as
well as by individual bikers and sellers, were calculated
and compared against competitive profit levels to obtain
aggregate and individual MPB and MPS market power
indices. In addition, for each run, the value for the market
efficiency measure EA in the last auction round was
calculated and recorded.
The means and standard deviations of the aggregate
and individual MPB and MPS market power indices were
then calculated across all 100 runs for each table cell.
The aggregate results are given at the top of each table
cell, and the restilts for individual buyers and sellers are
listed underneath. A mean market power outcome with a
positive or negative sign is marked with an asterisk if it is
substantially different fi^om zero, in the sense that the
indicated sign does not change when the outcome is either
increased or decreased by one standard deviation. Finally,
the mean and standard deviation for the maricet efficiency
measureBA calculated across all 100 runs are given at the
bottom of each table cell.
As explained in Section III.A, hypothesis HI predicts
that the l^B maricet power index for buyers should
decrease while the MPS market power index for sellers
should increase, all else equal, in response to increases in
relative demand capacity (RCAP). Looking at the market
power outcomes reported in Tables IV through VI,
however, it is seen that Hypothesis HI is not supported
under any of the three learning specifications. MPB
actually tends to increase and MPS to decrease with
increases in RCAP for each given relative concentration
(RCON) level, a direct contradiction of HI.
Also, hypothesis H2 predicts that the MPB maricet
power index for buyers should decrease while the MPS
market power index for sellers should increase, all else
equal, in response to decreases in relative concentration
RCON. The latter measure is simply the ratio of the
number of sellers to buyers. As seen in Tables IV through
VI, however, the changes in buyer and seller market
power levels in response to changes in RCON are small
and unsystematic, for each given level of RCAP, in
contradiction to hypothesis H2. This is particularly true
for the experiments comprising 10,000 auction rounds per
runreported inTable V.^°
In human-subject experiments with actual electricity
industry participants, Weiss [4, p.l] finds that "increasing
the number of sellers in a given (elecuicity) market does
not necessarily reduce market power (of sellers), as
suggested by most standard theory...." However, in
Weiss's study this failure of H2 is due to the existence of
available transmission capability (ATC) constraints that
effectively create local monopolies at some power grid
nodes, constraints that are not present in the current study.
Finally; hypothesis H3 predicts that high market
efficiency will be obtained. The mean and standard
deviation outcomes for market efficiency EA reported at
the bottom of each cell in Tables IV. through VI reveal
that high market efficiency is indeed generally obtained
for each tested RCAP/RCON - configuration.
Consequently, hypothesis H3 is strongly supported. Note
that the calibrated MRE algorithm with 10,000 auction
rounds per run strictly dominates'the other two learmng
specifications with regard to market efficiency. ' That, is,
the efficiency outcomes reported in each table cell for
Table V are as high or higher than the efficiency
outcomes reported in the corresponding •table cells .for
Table IV and Table VI.. . , ^
V. DISCUSSION
What explains the failure of the market power
hypotheses HI and H2 in the current electricity market
context? On the surface, this failure seems to contradict
basic economic intuition. Also, why is the market
efficiency hypothesis H3 so stronglysupported? .
A careful case-by-case examination of the -micro
events underlying the outcomes reported in Tables IV
through. VI goes a long way toward" dispelling the
mysteiy.. Briefly, one sees that the aggregate measures
RCAP andRCON are simply too crude to, reflect well the
opportunitieis for exercising marketpower that individual
buyers and sellers actually face. To understand the latter,
the market microstmcture must be carefully examined. In
Particular, as stressed by Code and Simder [18], it is
important to distinguish between market outcomes that
are due to market microstmcture and. market outcomes
that are due to learned behavior.
Two different definitions for market power will next
be given that permit the separate identification of market
power due to stmctural causes and market power due to
leaming. , ,
A. Structural Versus StrategicMarket Power
First suppose that no trader misrepresents its true
reservation price, i.e.,'suppose each buyer bids its tme
marginal revenue ^d each seller asks its tme marginal
cost. Under the discriminator midpoint pricing rule, the
exact relative positioning of the resulting "tme" market
demand and supply curves can still confer market power
on some buyers and not on others and on some sellers and
not on others. Call this structural market power.
In the current movement to restructure the electricity
industry, all participants are well aware that the choice of
auction protocol can substantially affect their relative
profitability. Thus, a consideration of the stmctural
market power allocated to different market participants
under alternative auction protocols would presumably be
ofmajor interest.
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Second, byengaging in unilateral misrepresentation of
their tme reservation prices, some buyers and/or some
sellers may have potentially, exercisable market power in
addition to (or even in the absence oD stmctural market
power. Call this{unilateral) strategicmarket power:
B. StructuralMarket Power Outcomes
•Analytically' 'derived stmctural market power
outcomes are presented in Table VII for the nine tested
RCAP/RCON configurations ,in Table II.'' The outcomes
in Table VII reveal three interesting regularities.
—Insert Table VII About.Here —
First, buyers have negative stmctural market power
and sellers have positive stmctural market power for six
of'the'nineitested RGAP/RCON,configurations: namely,
for the six cells in the first two columns in Table VII.
Consequently, in the current-electricity market context, it
is generally the bikers whoare stmcturally disadvantaged
in the auction with regard to market power.
' Second, for each given level of RCON, the average
stmctural maricet power of buyers as a whole increasesas
RCAP increases,' and the average stmctural market power
of sellers as a whole decreases as RCAP increases, in
direct contradiction to the market power hypothesis HI.
'"Third, for each given level of RCAP, the average
stmctural market power'of buyers as a whole and for
-sellers as a whole are invariant to changes in RCON. This
directlycontradicts the market power hypothesis H2. •
Comparing the experimental market power outcomes
reported in Tables IV through -VI against the analytically
derived stmctural market power outcomes reported in
Table VII, one sees tlwt the experimentally determined
'market power outcomes closely track the stmctural
market-power outcomes. Consequently, in the current
electricity- market context, market microstmcture is
strongly predictive for observed maricet power outcomes.
C. StrategicMarket Power Outcomes
' ' What' about strategic maricet power? Call a trader
inframarginal if it would engage iri a positive amount of
trade in competitive equilibrium, and extramarginal
In cell (1,1) of Table VII, the infi^marginal'sellers 3
and 6 have the same marginal cost but are matched with
different buyers at different prices depending on their
order of selection. In cell (3,3), the inframarginal buyers
1 and 4 have the same marginal revenue but are matched
with different sellers at different prices depending on their
order of selection. The stmctural market power levels
•reportedfor these traders are their expected market power
levels under the assumption that they are randomly
ordered for matching purposes.
otherwise. As will be clarified in Section V.E below,
every inframarginal buyer and seller in each of the nine
tested RCAP/RCON configurations in Table II has
positive strategic maricet power under the discriminatory
auction protocol. That is, assuming all other
inframarginal traders bid or ask their true reservation
prices, the remaining inframarginal trader can always
increase its profits above what it would obtain if it bid or
asked its truereservation price. If the trader is a buyer, it
can accomplish this by suitably lowering its bid price
below its true marginal revenue. If the trader is a seller, it
can accomplish this by suitably raising itsaskprice above
its true marginal cost. Under the discriminatory
midpoint-pricing rule, this opportumstic behavior would
then move theauction priceina direction favorable to the
trader.
Nevertheless, structurally disadvantaged traders never
leam to effectively exercise strategic market power in oiu*
auction experiments. By construction, the exercise of
strategic market power is measured by the discrepancies
between the experimentally determined market power
outcomes in Tables IV through VI and the analytically
derived levels for structural maricet power given in Table
VII. While there are some discrepancies in magnitudes,
there are no instances in which a trader with negative
structiual market power attains a positive market power
level in the auction. Moreover, mstances in which a
traderwith a positive structuralmarket power level attains
a negative marketpower level in the auctionare rare.
Specifically, the only sign discrepancies in mean
market power for all buyers or all sellers are as follows:
Table IV has t\vo sign discrepancies [the MPB index for
all buyers in cells (1,3) and (2,3)]; Table V has one sign
discrepancy [the MPB index for ^1 buyers in cell (1,3)];
and Table VI has no sign discrepancies. In each case the
sign discrepancy in the mean MPB level for all buyers is
due to a sign discrepancy occurring for the mean MPB
level of a single buyer: namely, Buyer 1. Note, also, that
tliese sign discrepancies are all to the disadvantage of
Buyer1, i.e., its realized auction market poweris negative
whereas its structural market power is positive. Finally,
note that none of the mean MPB values showing a sign
discrepancy is marked with an asterisk. This implies that
the sign discrepancy disappears within one standard
deviation of the reported mean observation.
These findings show that, apart from the small number
of sign discrepancy cases noted above, learning has no
effect on the relative exercise of market power by buyers
and sellers. When the discriminatory auction protocol
gives greater structural market power to buyers, the
buyers retain this relative market power advantage in the
auction experiments, and similarly for sellers. Indeed,
when buyers attaina positive meanmarketpower level in
the auction, the mean market power level attained by
sellers in the auction is negative, and vice versa. As will
be clarified in Section V.E, this "zero-sum game" finding
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reflects the high maricet efficiency levels attained in the
auction experiments.
D. Efficiency Outcomes
Apart from round-off and tnmcation error, the market
efiiciency measure EA defined in Section ni.A equals
100 percent in any given auction round if and only if the
set of active traders in the auction round coincides with
the setofactive traders in competitive equilibrium.'^ This
implies, in particular, that no extramarginal trader
manages to trade in the auction, and that no infra-
marginal traderfails to trade in the auction.
Comparing the meanand standard deviation outcomes
reported in Table IV through Table VI for EA, one sees
that the highest mean market efficiency outcomes are
uniformly attained in Table V. The latter table reports
outcomes for the case in which all buyers and sellers use
the calibrated MREalgorithm with 10,000 auction rounds
•per run. In each cell of Table V, the market efficiency
measure EA attains a mean value of 94 percent or better.
Nevertheless, generally high mean market efficiency
outcomes are also reported in Table IV and Table VI for
distincdy different settings of the MRE algorithm
parameters, andwth only 1000auction roundsper run.
The overall implication of these generally high market
efficiency levels is that the discriminatory auction
essentially reduces to a zero-sum game. That is, total
buyer and seller profits are approximately given by total
competitive profits in each experiment, and tlie key
remaining issue is how these profits are redistributed
among buyers and sellers as one switches from
competitive equilibrium pricing to discriminatory auction
pricing.
Profit distribi;tion under the discriminatory auction is
measured by market power. If total profit remains
constant as one switches from competitive to auction
pricing, then market power simply measures the manner
in which the auction redistributes this constant total profit
between buyers and sellers. In this case, apart from
round-offerror, a positiveattained market power level for
one type of trader necessarily implies a negative attained
market power level for the other. As noted in Section
V.C, it is indeed seen in Tables IV through VI that table
cells reporting a high mean market efficiency level also
generally report a mean maricet power level for all buyers
This simple characterization for market efficiency has
to be slightly qualified in the presenceof marginal traders
with identical marginal revenues or marginal costs who
do not all end up trading in competitive equilibrium. In
this case, market efficiency holds regardless of which of
these marginal traders actually carries out the marginal
competitive equilibrium trades. This indeterminacy is
absent for the nine tested configurations in Table II.
thatis opposite in signto themean market power level for
all sellers. • •
E,Micro Analysisfor Illustrative Cases
To better understand the underlying reasons for the
findings reported in Section IV, a more detailed micro
analysis will now be given for two of the tested
RCAP/RCON combinations in Table II: namely, cell (3,1)
and cell (3,2).
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Fig. 2. Cell (3,1) true demand and supply curves for 6 buyers
and 3 sellers with 10MWh and 40 MWh capacities re^ectively.
First, consider cell (3,1) in Table II with RCAP-=
RCON = 1/2. The market for this case comprises six
buyers, each with capacity 10 MWh, and three sellers,
each with capacity 40 MWh. The marginal revenues and
marginal costs for these buyers and sellers are listed in
Table III. Making use of these capacity, revenue, and cost
specifications, the true demand and supply curves can be
constructed; these are depicted in Fig. 2. The competitive
outcome based on these demand and supply curves is Q =
40 MWh and P = $14/MWh.
The low RCAP value 1/2 for this case implies the
existence of excess potential supply, which suggests that
buyers should be favored. Yet the experimental market
power outcomes reported for this case in cell (3,1) in
Tables IV through VI,show that Seller 3 is the only trader
in the discriminatory auction that is successfully able to
attaina positive market power level on average. Why is
this the case?
It will now be shown that Seller 3 is the only trader
that has positive structural market power. On the other
hand, all inframarginal buyers. and sellers have
countervailing strategic market power. This prevents any
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U"ader with negative structural market power under the
auction protocol.from being able to successMly exercise
its strategic market power to the point that it attains a
'positive market power level.
Under the discriminatory auction protocol, it is the 80
MWh unused capacity of Seller 1 and Seller 2 that
constitutes the excess potential supply reflected in
RCAP=l/2. liiese two sellers have relatively high
marginal costs of $35/MWhand $I6/MWh, respectively.
•If.all traders bid and^ask their.true reservation prices in
ithe auction. Seller 1 and Seller 2 will not obtain an
auction match. Nevertheless, since they also fail to trade
,in competitive equilibrium, their profits imderthe auction
are the same as imder competitive equilibrium. This
implies that their structural market power is zero even
thoughtheirMPS indicesare notwell defined.
Similarly, the relatively low marginal revenue
$I2/MWh of Buyer 3 and Buyer 6 prevents any auction
matchfor these buyers if all tradersbid and ask their true
reservation prices. Thus, since they also fml to trade in
competitive equilibrium, their structi^ maricet power is
zero even though theirMPB indices are not well defined.
Seller 3 has a relatively low marginal cost of Sll/MWh,
and its total electricity supply capacity is 40 MWh.
Buyers 1 and 4 have a relatively high marginal revenue
(willingness to pay) of $37/MWh, and their total
electricity demand capacity is 20 MWh. Under the
discriminatory midpoint pricing rule, assuming all traders
bid or ask their true reservation prices. Buyers 1 and 4
would purchase 20 MWh from Seller 3 at a price of
$24/M>^, a price that exceeds the competitive price of
.$I4/MWh. The profit of Seller 3 on this 20 MWh
contract would thus be $260, greater than its competitive
profit $60, and the profit of Buyers 1 and 4 would each be
$130, less than their competitive profit $230.
Buyers 2 arid 5 with marginal revenue $17/MWh
.would then end up purchasing Seller 3's remaining 20
MWh at the competitive price $14/MWh, giving Seller 3
a (competitive) profit of $60 and Buyers 2 and 5 each a
•(competitive) profit of $30. The MPS structural market
power index for Seller 3 is then calculated to be 1.67, the
MPB structural market power index for Bityers 1 and 4 is
-0.43, and the MPB structural market power indices for
Buyers 2 and 5 are zero.
These observations imply that, contrary to the
implications of hypothesis HI, excess potential supply (a
low RCAP value) can fail to ensure ^at any buyer has
positive structural market power in the discriminatory
..auction. Thereason for this is thatexcess potential supply
can come from, tiie excess capacity of high-cost sellers
who are extramarginal under competitive equilibrium.
Assuming all traders bid or ask their true reservation
prices, these sellers will not be able to obtain matches in
the discriminatory auction. Consequentiy, the presence of
. theseextra-marginal sellersconfers neitheradvantage nor
disadvantage on any other trader with regard to structural
market power, yet their presence can"change the value of
the relative capacity measure RCAP. Similar
observations apply for extramarginalbuyers in the reverse
case of excess potential demand.
What about strategic market power? Consider, once
again, cell (3,1) in Table II with true demand and supply
curves depicted in Fig. 2. It turns out that Seller 3 and
Buyers 1, 4, 2, and 5 all have some degree of strategic
marketpowerunder the discriminatory auction protocol.
Specifically, by unilaterally misrepresenting their true
wllingness to pay by bidding below their true marginal
revenue $37/MWh, Buyer 1 and Buyer 4 can each
increase their auction profits. Indeed, if either buyer were
to bid $12/MWh plus some small amoimt epsilon, hence
above the price $12/MWh at which the extramarginal
Buyers 3 and 6would be able to match, theywould obtain
a profit close to $250 on their 10 MWh purchase fi-om
Seller 3. The latter profit is greater than their $230
competitive profits and much greater than the $130
auction profits that tlieywould earn by bidding their true
marginal revenue. The MPB strategic market power
indices for Buyers 1 and 4 are approximately 0.09.
Similarly, the MPB strategic market power indices for
Buyer 2 and Buyer 5 (who should also strategically bid
$12/MWh plus epsilon) are approximately 0.67.
On the other hand. Seller 3 also has strategic market
power. Suppose Seller 3 unilaterally raises its ask price
from its true marginal cost $Il/MWh up to $16/MWh
minus epsilon but no higher (to prevent Seller 2 fi"om
matching). Then the contract price of Seller 3 with Buyer
1 and Buyer 4 for 20 MWh under the discriminatory
midpoint pricing rule would be close to $26.50/MWh.
This would give Seller 3 a profit of $310, higher than the
$260 profits it would earn in the auction by asking its true
marginal cost, and much higher than its $60 competitive
profits.
In addition, by asking $16/MWh minus epsilon, Seller
3's contract price with Buyer 2 and Buyer 5 for 20 MWh
would be approximately $I6.50/MWh. This would give
Seller 3 a profit of $110, which is higher than the $60
profits that Seller 3 would earn on this 20 MWh contract
eitlier in tlie discriminatory auction with bidding and
asking of true reservation prices or in competitive
equilibrium. The total profit of Seller 3 would therefore
be $420, hence the MPS strategic market power index for
Seller 3 is 2.50.
Thus, Seller 3 and Buyers 1, 4, 2, and 5 in cell (3,1) all
have positive strategic market power. As previously
determined, however, only Seller 3 has positive structural
market power. Examining the results reported for cell
(3,1) in Tables IV through VI, it is seen that none of the
buyers succeeds in exercising its strategic market power
to the point that it ends up wth a positive MPB market
powerlevel in the auction. The problem for the buyers is
that strategic market power is being exercised on both
sides of the market When ask prices are being raised by
sellers at the same time that bid prices are being lowered
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by buyers, the tendency is for the midpoint price of each
bid-ask spread to remain essentially the same.
An examination of the actual price offers submitted to
the auction by Seller 3 and Buyers 1, 4, 2, and 5 in cell
(3,1) reveals this effect. Seller 3 learns to submit ask
prices higher than its marginal cost, and this exercise of
strategic market power by Seller 3 foils the attempts by
the buyers to lower their auction price by underbidding
their true marginal revenues.
Specifically,' as seen inFig. 3, theaverage ask price of
Seller 3 in the final auction round is roughly $l5/MWh
regardless of the precise parameter values set for the
MRE algorithm. Note fi"om Table III that $15/MWh
exceeds Seller 3's true marginal cost of $ll/MWh and is
just below the price $16/MWh at which the extramarginal
Seller 2 could feasibly enter the market
—Insert Figure 3 About Here —
On the other hand, on average, the bid prices of Buyer
1 and Buyer 4 in the final auction round are rou^y
$24/MWh for each tested MRE algorithm specification.
This level is lower than their true marginal revenue
$37/MWh but also higher than the level $I2/MWh at
which the extramarginal Buyer 3 and Buyer 6 could
feasibly enter the market Also, on average, the bid prices
of Buyer 2 and Buyer 5 in each final auction round are
roughly $15/MWh, below their true marginal revenue of
$17/MWh but high enough to prevent entry by Buyer 3
and Buyer 6.
Tlius, all active traders in cell (3,1) exercise strategic
market power to some degree by asking higher than true
marginal costs or bidding below true marginal revenues.
Nevertheless, the net result of these countervailing forces
is that Seller 3's stmctural market power advantage
prevails.
Regarding market efiiciency, bid and ask price data for
cell (3,1) reveal that all inframarginal traders learn to
place their bids and asks \vithin ranges that prevent tlie
entry of extramarginal traders. Moreover, the buyers end
up bidding above asks, on average, so that coordination
failures are relatively infrequent The result is high market
efficiency, despite the fact that Seller 3 achieves a
relatively high market power level.
Higher market efiiciency is achieved for cell (3,1) as
the overall volatiUty of the laid and ask prices in the final
auction round decreases. As indicated in Fig. 3 for Seller
3, the greatest overall volatility is observed for the
calibrated MRE algorithm with 1000 auction rounds per
run and the least overall volatility is observed for the
calibrated MRE algorithm with 10,000 auction rounds per
run. This decline in volatility is particularly marked for
Buyer 2 and Buyer 5.
Next, consider cell (3,2) in Table II with RCAP = 1
and RCON = 1/2. The market for this case comprises six
buyers, each with capacity 10 MWh, and three sellers,
each with capacity 20 M>^. The marginal revenues and
margiiial costs for these buyers and sellers are listed in
Table III. Making use of these specifications for
capacities, revenues, and costs, the true demand 'and
supply curves can be constructed; these are depicted in
Fig. 4. The competitive outcome based on these demand
and supply curves is Q= 40MWhandP = $16.50/MWh.
An ankysis of the results reported for cell (3,2) in
Tables IV through VI proceeds along lines similar to. the
foregoing analysis for cell (3;1), with one interesting
exception. As seen by comparing Fig. 4 with Fig. 2,
Buyer 2, Buyer 5, ^d Seller 2 in cell (3,2) face a much
greater challenge with regard to learning how to.select
their bid and ask prices than any inframarginal trader in
cell (3,1). This is "because the'price range in .which.they
can successfully match is much narrower.
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Fig. 4. Cell (3,2) true demand and supply curves for 6 buyers
and 3 sellers withlO MWh and 20 MWh capacities respectively
Indeed, under the calibrated MRE algorithm with 1000
auction rounds per run, it is seen in cell (3,2) ofTable IV
that Buyer 2 fails to match at all and Buyer 5 matches
only rarely. An examination of bid and ask data for cell
(3;2) in Table IV reveals that the bid prices of these
buyers are extremely volatile, and they, .almost never
exceed the marginal cost of Seller 2. Consequently, this
learning specification does not permit price discovery for
these buyers.
Seller 2 in cell (3,2) of Table IV manages to match
frequendy enough with Buyer 1 and Buyer 4 to sustain a
positive average market, power level, although with
extremelyhigh standard deviation. The average ask price
of Seller 2 is "roughly $20/MWh, which is higher,than the
marginalrevenue $17/MWhof Buyer 2,and Buyer 5. TTie
average ask price ofBuyer 1 and Buyer 4 in cell (3,2) of
Table IV is roughly $25/MWh. .Interestingly, the average
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ask price ofSeller 3 in cell (3,2) ofTable IVisonly about
$16/MWh, which is belowthe.marginal revenue ofBuyer
2 and-Buyer 5. Neve^eless, given theextreme volatility
of these latter buyers' bids, matches with these buyers
essentially never occur.
Buyer 2 andBuyer 5 in cell (3,2) perform better under
the MRE algorithm specifications reported inTable Vand
Table VI. For example, bid data for Buyers 2 and 5 in
cell (3,2) ofTable VI reveal that they manage to bid close
to their true margin^. revenue $17/MWli in the final
auction round in about one third of the 100 runs, and this
percentageimprovesfor Table V.
•. -In contrast, Seller 2 in cell (3,2) performs worse in
Tables V and VI, failing to match at all in Table V. In
TableVI, the average ask price of Seller 2 in cell (3^2) is
only about $16/MWh, close to its true marginal cost. This
permits matches with Buyer 2 andBuyer 5, butwith, very
little gaing to trade. In contrast, the,average askprice of
Seller 3 in cell (3,2) of Table VI is around $15/MWh.
Thus, as the seller submitting the lowest ask on average.
Seller 3 is now matchedmost frequentlywith Buyer 1 and
Buyer 4, thus crowding out Seller 2 and forcing"Seller 2
to tradewith Buyer 2 and.Buyer 5 for much lower gain.
,The average askprice ofBuyer1 andBuyer 4 in cell (3,2)
.ofTable VI isa.bout $24/M^.
Despite the increased challenge that some traders face
to achieve matches in cell (3,2), the coordination failures
:mostly involve marginal traderswith smallgains to trade.
.Consequently, highmarketefficiency is still achieved.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A. Summary ofKeyFindings
The carefiil testing of auction protocols for a
restructured electricity market by means of an agent-
based computationalmodel imposes two requirements on
this model. First, the model should adequately reflect the
actu^ microstructure of the market. Second, the artificial
traders iii the model should behave in ways that
approjamate the behavior of real traders.
This study attempts to capture in a computational
model the basic features of a restructured wholesale
electricity market operating'in the short run, abstracting
from longer-nm contracting considerations. We have
assumed that, under restructuring, a small number of
heterogeneous buyers (energy service providers) actively
participate in this maricet along with a small number of
heterogeneous sellers (generators). The buyers and sellers
submit price and' quantity offers repeatedly to a
clearinghouse double auction that employs discriminatoiy
midpoint pricing. The capacities, marginal revenues, and
marginal costs of the buyers and sellers are private
information. These features imply that the buyers ^and
sellers face an inherently complex strategic situation.
Moreover, we have attempted to implement learning
mamanner supported by empirical data Each buyer and
seller is assumed to update its price offers over time in
accordance with the MRE learning algorithm, a modified
\ ersion of an individual reinforcement learning algorithm
developed by Roth and Erev [16). [l^l- The latter
researchers de%eloped their algorithm on the basis of
extensive data obtained from experiments with human
subjects inmultiagent decision environments.
As detailed in Section III.A. we test two hypotheses
regarding relative market po\\er. HI and H2. As seen in
Scction IV. one key finding of this study is that
hypothesis HI is not supported. When relative
concentration (RCON) is held fixed, the effects of
increasing relative capacity (RCAP) are often in the
opposite direction ofthe effects predicted by H1.
A second key finding of this study is that h>'pothesis
H2 also receives no support Holding RCAP fixed,
changes in RCON have only small uns>stematic effects
on market power in contradiction to H2.''' This latter
finding strongly cautions against the common practice of
confounding capacity and concentration effects in market
power studies by letting firm size and numbers offirms
van together in an uncontrolled way.
TTie prd)lem with hypotheses HI and H2 in the current
electricity market context is that they attempt to predict
rclati\'e market power effects purely on the basis of
aggregate aspects of market structure as measured b>'
RCAP and RCON, However, as seen in Section IV.
neither aggregate turns out to be well correlated with the
actual opportunities open to individual buyers and sellers
to exercise market power luiderthe discriminatory auciion
protocol.
In contrast as shown in Section V. the m/crostructure
of tlie electricity market is strongly predicli\'e for the
relative ability of buyers and sellers to exercise market
power in the discriminatory auction. More precisely, the
relative market power levels attained by buyers and
sellers when they are permitted to learn to make
opportunistic price offers closely track the relative
"structural" market power levels they attain when the
buyers are instead forced to bid their true willingness to
'• Indeed, in game-theoretic terms, it can be shown that
the computational electricity market has numerous "pure
Nash equilibria" i.e.. numerous offer configurations that
satisfv the following condition: Given the price and
quantity offers of all other traders, no individual trader
can increase its profits by means of a unilateral deviation
from its own cuirent price and quantity offers.
Interestingly, a similar finding of unsystematic effects
for changes inRCON. taking RCAP as given, is reported
inTesfatsion (22] for a computational labor market.
pay and the sellers are instead forced to ask their true
marginal costs.
Interestingly, examining the market power results
obtained in an earlier electricity stud>' by the authors j23.
Table 3) inwhich thebuyer and seller populations instead
each engage in social mimicrv learning via a genetic
algorithm (GA). it is seen that a similar conclusion holds.
Stitictural maricel power is strongly predicii%e for the
relative exercise of market po\>er b> Uie buyers and
sellers; the effects of GA social mimicry learning on
relative market power are small and unsystematic. For
ease of comparison, these GA results are reproduced here
as Table Vlll.'-
Taken together, these relative market power outcomes
suggest thai the microstiucture of our electricity maricet
under the discriminatory auction protocol so strongly
cliannels the behavior of buyers and sellers that the
precise form of their learning beha\ior is largely
irrelevant. As noted next however, tlus robustness to
variations in leanung behavior does not extend ftilly to
efficiency outcomes.
As detailed in Section HI.A, we also test a basic
market efficiency hy-pothesis (H3), AUiird key finding of
our study is that this hypothesis H3 is strongly supported.
The markei efficiency measure EA is 90 percent or better
for almost all of the tested RCAP/RCON configurations.
Tlie particular parameter values specified for the MRE
learning algorithm used by traders in our current
electricity markei study do affect tlie ability of some
traders to avoid coordination failure. However, in
accordance with hypothesis H3. the trades in question are
marginal trades offering the smallest gains, and the
resulting effects onmarkei efficiency generally tend tobe
small andunsystematic. Ourexperiments suggest thatthe
number of auction rounds per run may be a more
important determinant of mjiricet efficiency than these
parametersettingsper se.
On the otlier liand, tlic market efficiency levels of the
auction outcomes obtained in |231 under the assumption
that the electricity traders instead use GA social mimicry
learning are reported in Table VIII. These results show
that market efficiency obtained with GA social mimicry
learning is substantially degraded relative to market
efficiency obtained with individual MRE learning.
Consequently, market efficiency is not robust with respect
to switches from individual to social learning.
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Table VllI corrects a labeling problem in the original
Table 3 in Nicolaisen et al. 123]: namely, the Table 3 row
labeled RC0N=l/2 should instead have been labeled
RC0N=2, and vice versa.
For an example of an oligopoly market in which a
switch from individual to social learmng results in
substantially higher average output, see Vriend 124,
Fig.5]. In Vriend's example, all firms have identical costs.
As detailed in Section V.E, a careful examination of
the bid and ask behavior of individual buyers and sellers
in ourelectricity market provides an explanation for these
market power and efficiency findings. Since both trader
types can submit opportunistic price offers, each type has
countervailing strategic market power thatholds in check
the ability of the other type to offiset the structural market
power biases inherent in the discnmmatory auction
protocol per se. This is true whether the traders use
individual or social learning.
Nevertheless, under individual MRE learning,
inframarginal traders are better able to home in on bids
and asks that are sufficiently close to their true
reservation prices to ensure positive bid-ask spreads and
prevent entry by extramarginal traders. Coordination
failure is thus largely avoided, meaning that the set of
trades conducted under the discriminatory auction agrees
closely with the set of trades that would occur in
competitive equilibrium. The result is high market
efficiency, despite the fact that some buyers and sellers
have substantially positive or negative structural maricet
power levels. The root cause of the inefficiency under
GA social mimicry learning is a relatively high
coordination failure rate due to inappropriate mimicry by
structurally distinct traders.
B. Comparison with Other Studies
Our findings regarding relative market power support
the conclusion reached by Weiss [4] for human-subject
electricity market experiments that active bidding by
buyers may limit the ability of sellers to exercise market
power. However, since Weiss only considers nodal and
uniform pricing, he is not led to consider the distinction
between structural and strategic market power.
In our context, the discriminatory auction protocol
inherently allocates market power to some traders in
preference to others, even in the absence of opportunistic
bids and asks. On the other hand, all buyers and sellers
can attempt to secure strategic maiket power, in the sense
that bityers can attempt to increase their profits by bidding
lower than their true marginal revenues and sellers can
attempt to increase their profits by asking higher than
their true marginal costs. Therefore our market power
conclusion must be nuanced by saying that the presence
of active traders on each side of the market reduces the
ability of structurally disadvantaged traders to overcome
the structural market power biases inherent in the auction
protocol through the exercise of strategic market power.
In addition, the ability to exercise strategic maricet power
is fiirther limited in our context by the threat of entry by
extramarginal traders.
Our findings regarding market efficiency are
reminiscent of the conclusions reached by Code and
Sunder [18] and other previous researchers regarding the
efficiency of continuous double auctions. A continuous
double auction is a double auction in which bids and asks
^ continuously received, trades caii occur at any time,
and bids and asks^are accepted by the traders themselves
. rather matched by. a clearinghouse. As noted by
Friedman [5, pp. 5-6], continuous double auctions have
been observed in human-subject experiments to induce
very efficient outcomes under a wde range of treatment
conditions, much' more so than traditional economic
theory would suggest.
Akey questiori raised by Gode and Sunder [18] isthe
extent to which the efficiency of any given market
mechanism is attributable to trader rationality or inherent
in the design of the' mechanism. Their findings for
continuous double auctions with zero-intelligence traders
suggest that efficiency is inherent in the continuous
double auction mechanism per se.
Similarly, our market efficiency findings would seem
to suggest that efficiency is inherent in the design of the
discriminatory clearinghouse double auction mechamsm.
Nevertheless, this conclusion is. tempered by two
additional findings. .
First, nwket efficiency is seriously degraded when
the buyer and seller populations each use GA social
mimicry learning inst^ of individual MRE learning.
This form of social mimiciy is not particularlyappropriate
in the current electricity context since buyers have
different marginal revenues and sellers have different
-marginal costs. Second, as indicated in Section lI.E
(footnote, 6); market efficiency can also be seriously
degraded when buyers ,and sellers learn in accordance
with the original learning algorithm, implying that
they do not respond to the unfavorable stimulus of zero
profits.
These two additional findings ^ggest that the
following caution is in order. While the discriminatoiy
clearinghouse double auction may reliably deliver high
. market efficiencj^ when buyers and sellers refrain from
inappropriate learning behavior, it may not be robust
against the active exercise of bad judgment
The extent to which our market power and efficiency
findings generalize to wholesale electricity markets
operating under different auction protocols is an
interesting open question. For example, would oiu*
findings generalize to clearinghouse double auctions with
uniform pricing? Or to continuous double auctions
exhibiting the various special types of rules (opening
price rules, priority rules, etc.) listed by Domowitz [25]
on the basis of a survey of systems in actual operation?
Under alternative .auction protocols, the learning
behavior of,traders might have more substantial effects on
market power or market efficiency because the traders
have a greater leeway for the exercise of strategic market
power. In any case, it might be that the MRE learning
algorithm applied in the current study is too simplistic to
capture fiilly the strategic opportunities open to the traders
For example, Camerer and Ho [26] have developed
an individual learning algorithm that permits traders to
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use past observations to form beliefs about what other
traders willdo in the future. Wouldthe observed strategic
behavior of traders under Camerer-Ho learning differ
significantly from what we have observed using
individual MRE leanung and GA social mimicry
learning? In particular, would the use of Camerer-Ho
learning permit traders to overcome structural market
power biases through strategic pricing? The inability of
the traders in our current experiments to overcome
structural market power biases through strategic pricing
appears to be due inore to the symmetric design of the
double auction (simultaneous bids and asks) than to any
lack of learning power per se. However, a more
systematic examination ofthis issue isclearly needed.
In addition, the representation of the traders' actions
in thecurrent study is very simplistic: each trader submits
a single price offer and a single quantity offer to the
auction in each auction round. In contrast, as described in
Bower andBunn [10], eachgenerator in the England and
Wales day-ahead electricity market submits price and
quantity offers for up to three incremental levels of output
for each of its generating units. That is, in each auction
round each generator submits a supply function rather
than a single price-quantity pair. Thedomain of possible
offers byeach generator is thus enormously enlarged from
a setof points to a setof functions.
To handle these real-world features, it seems
essential to permit the traders to engage in more
comprehensive forms of learning that include inductive
reasoning (experimentation with new ideas) as well as
aspects of reinforcement learning, social mimicry, and
forecasting of future events. As discussed by Chattoe
[27], social scientists are just beginning to appreciate the
care and attention needed to model computationally the
leammg behavior ofmultiple social agents interacting in
complex real-world contexts.
These issues, critically important for the
computational modeling of restructured electricity
markets, will be addressed in future smdies.
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Fig. 3. Plot ofSeIler3's ask price in cell (3,1) in the final generation across all 100 runs under three differentMRE algorithm
specifications: A) Table IV~ calibrated MRE algorithmwith 1000 auction rounds perrun; B) Table V~ calibrated MRE
algorithm with 10,000 auction rounds per run; and C) Table VI - best-fit MRE algorithm with 1000 auction rounds per run.
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TABLE IV
EXPERIMENTAL MARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCYOUTCOMES FOR THE CALIBRATED MRE ALGORITHM
WITH 1000 AUCTION ROUNDS AND PARAMETER VALUES s(l) = LOO, r = 0.04, A>4D e = 0.97. ZP INDICATES
THAT ZERO PROFITS WERE EARNED BOTH INTHE AUCTION AND IN COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM.
Relative Capacity
1/2 1 * 2
MP StdDev MP StdDev MP StdDev
All Buyers: -0.27 (0.18) All Buyers: -0.23 • (0.17) All Buyers: -0.06 (0.28)
All Sellers: 0.46 (0.88) All Sellers: 0.29 (0.48) All Sellers: -0.24 (0.33)
Buyer[l]: -0.24 (0.26) Buyer[I]: .0.21' (0.19) Buyer[l]: -0.06 (0.28)
Buycrpj: -0.68* (0.50) Buyer[2]: -0.87 (0.96) Buyer[2 ]: ZP (0.00)
2 Buyerpj: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[I]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: 1.75 (5.46) SellcrI2]: -0.24 (0.46)
SellcrI3]: 0.37 (1.97) Sel]er[3]: 0.17 (0.85) Seller[3]: -0.24 (0.37)
Seller[4]: ZP (0.00) Seller[4}: ZP (0.00) Seller[4]: ZP (0.00)
Sener[51: ZP (0.00) SellerI5]: 1.39 (4.71) Seller[5]: -0.22 (0.44)
Seller[6]: 0.54 (1.32) SeUer[6]: 0.19 (0.80) Seller[6]: -0.25 (0.37)
Efficiency: 96.01 (0.08) Efficiency: 96.30 (0.11) Efficiency: 77.60 (0.15)
MP StdDev MP StdDev MP StdDev
Relative
All Buyers: -0.37* (0.20) All Buyers: -0.26* (0.17) All Buyers: -0.13 (0.37)
All Sellers: 0.55 (0.67) All Sellers: 0.44 (0.56) All Sellers: -0.27 (0.37)
Concentration
Buyer[l]: -0.33* (0.20) Buyer(l]: -0.24* (0.18) Buyer[l]: -0.13 (0.37)
Buyer[21: -0.73* (0.50) Buyer[2]: -1.00 (0.00) Buyer{2]: ZP (0.00)
1 Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]: ZP
(0.00) Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]; ZP (0.00)
Seller[2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: 2.37 (6.49) Seller[2]: -0.29 (0.51)
Seller[3]; 0.40 (0.86) Seller[3]: 0.27 (0.90) Seller[3]: -0.25 (0.37)
Efficicncy: 86.8S (0.18) Efficiency: 96.48 (0.05) Efficiency: 90.98 (0.24)
MP StdDev MP StdDev MP StdDev
All Buyers: -0.33* (0.16) All Buyers: -0.25* (0.16) All Buyers: 0.01 (0.33)
All Sellers: 0.55* (0.50) All Sellers: 0.44 (0.44) All Sellers: -0.21 (0.25)
Buyer[l]: -0.29* (0.19) Buyer[l]; -0.21* (0.17) Buyer[l]: 0.01 (0.43)
Buycr[2]: -0.68* (0.52) Buyer[2]; -1.00 (0.00) Buyer[2]: ZP (0.00)
1/2 Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3): ZP (0.00) Buyeri3]: ZP (0.00)
Buyer[4]: -0.29* (0.17) Buyer[4]: -0.25* (0.24) Buyer[4]: -0.03 (0.44)
Buyer[5]: -0.68* (0.49) Buyer[5]: -0.98* (0.20) Buyer[51: ZP (0.00)
Buyer[6]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[6]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[6]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]; ZP (0.00)
Seller[2]; ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: 0.77 (4.60) Seller[2]; -0.25 (0.37)
Seller[3]: 0.37 (0.76) SeIIer[3]: 0.41 (0.72) Seller[3]: -0.18 (0.31)
Efnciency; 85.53 (0.18) Efficiency: 96.39 (0.04) Efficiency; 96.55 (0.13)
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' . TABLE V
EXPERIMENTALMARKET POWER AND EFHCENCYOUTCOMES FORTHE CALIBRATED MRE ALGORITHM
WITH 10 000 AUCTIONROUNDS AND PARAMETER VALUES s(l) =1.00, r=0.02, AND e=0.99. ZP INDICATES
THAT ZERO PROFITS WERE EARNED BOTH IN THE AUCTION AND IN COMPETTTTVE EQUILIBRIUM.
, 1/2 -
Relative Capacity
1 2
MP StdDev MP StdDev MP
StdDev
All Buyers: -0.04 (0.07) All Buyers: -0.07 (0.26) All Buyers: -0.07 (0.24)
' All Sellers: 0.19 (0.32) All Sellers: 0.21* (0.19), All Sellers: -0.06 (0.19)
Buyer[l]: -0.04 (0.06) Buyer[l]: •0.07* (0.05) Buyer[ll: -0.07 (0.24)
Buyer[2]: -0.04 (0.33) Buyer[2]: -0.30 (0.47) Buyer(2 ]: ZP (0.00)
2 Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]: > ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]:
t
ZP (0.00)
Seller[l]: ZP' (0.00) Sellerll]: ZP (0.00). , Seller[l]: ZP (0.00)
. SeUeT[2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: -0.15 (0.79) Seller[2]: -0.06 (0.24)
• Seller[3]: 0.23 (0.44) Sel!er[3]:. 0.26» (0.22) Sellerl3]: •0.06 (0.17)
:SeUer[4]: ZP "(0.00) Setler[4]: ZP (0.00) Seller[4]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[5J: ZP (0.00) Seller[5]: -0.30 (0.63) Seller[5]: -0.06 (0.25)
Sel[er[6}: 0.14 (0.36) Seller(6]: 0.24* (0.21) : Seller[6]: -0.06 (0.17)
Efficiency; 100.00 (0.00) Efficiency: 99.49 (0.01) : Efficiency: 100.00 (0.00)
MP StdDev MP StdDevi f MP StdDev
Relative
All Buyers -0.16* (0.09) All Buyers: -0.08* (0.07) All Buyers: 0.06 , (0.24)
All Sellers: 0.60* (0.38) All Sellers: 0.22 (0.28) All Sell^s: -0.05 (0.19)
Concentration
Buyer[l]: -0.14* (0.07) Buyer[l]: -0.08* (0.07) . Buyer[l]: 0.06 (0.24)
Buyer[2]: -0.30 (0.38) Buycr(2]: -0.30 (0.58) Buyer(2]: ZP (0.00)
1
Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) BuyerI3]: ZP (0.00) . Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00)
Sellerll]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) SeUer[l]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: -0.05 (1.15) Seller[2]: -0.05 (0.24)
SellerI3]: 0.60* (0.38) Seller[3]: 0.25 (0.32) Seller[3]: -0.04 (0.16)
- Efficiency: 94.13 (0.09) Efficiency: 99.66 (0.01) Efficiency: 100.00 (0.00)
MP StdDev , ; MP. StdDev MP StdDev
All Buyers -0.14* (0.07) All Buyers: •0.06* (0.05) All Buyers: 0.10 (0.20)
All Sellers: 0.59* (0.36) All Sellers: 0.20* (0.19) • All Sellers: -0.08 (0.16)
Buyerfl]: -0.14* (0.06) 'Buyerll]: -0.06 (0.06) Buyerll]: 0.10 (0.20)
Buyer[2]: -0.24 (0.36) BuyerI2]: -0.31 (0.60) Buyer[2]: ZP (0.00)
1/2 Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]: , ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00)
Buyer[4]: -0.12* (0.06) Buyer[4]: -0.06 (0.06) Buyeri41: 0.10 (0.20)
Buyerisj: -0.23 (0.34) Buyer[5]: -0.27 (0.64) Buyer[5]: ZP (0.00)
Buyer[6]: ZP (0.00) Buyer [6]:
j 1
ZP (0.00)' Buyer(6]: ZP (0.00)
SeUCT[l]:. ZP (0.00) Seller[I]: ZP (0.00) • Seller[l]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: -0.10 (0.20)
" Seller[3]: 0.59* (0.36) Seller[3]: 0.20* (0.19) . Seller[3]; -0.07 (0.14)
Efficiency: 95.22 (0.09) Efficiency: 99.56 (0.01) Efficiency: 100.00 (0.00)
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TABLE VI
EXPERIMENTAL MARKETPOWER AND EFFICIENCY OUTCOMES FOR THE BEST-FITMRE ALGORITHM
WITH 1000 AUCTION ROUNDS AND PARAMETER VALUES s(l) = 9.00, r = 0.10, AND e = 0.20. ZP INDICATES
THAT ZERO PROFITS WERE EARNED BOTH IN THE AUCTION AND IN COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM.
Relative Capacity
1/2 1 2
MP StdDev MP StdDev MP StdDev
All Buyers: -0.13* (0.09) All Buyers: -0.15* (0.09) All Buyers: 0.10 (0.30)
All Sellers: 0.35* (0.38) All Sellers: 6.38* (0.33) All Sellers: -0.10 (0.25)
Buyer[I]: -0.12* (0.08) Buyerfl]: -0.13* (0.10) Buyer[l]: 0.10 (0.30)
Buyer[2]: -0.20 (0.40) Buyer[2]: -0.75* (0.33) Buyer[2 ]: ZP (0.00)
2 Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[31; ZP (0.00)
Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: -0.50 (1.34) Seller[2]: -0.12 (0.34)
Seller[3]: 0.54 (0.63) Seller[3]: 0.45* (0.40) Seller[3]: -0.10 (0.22)
Seller[4]: ZP (0.00) Seller[4]: ZP (0.00) Seller[4]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[5]: ZP (0.00) SeUer[5]: -0.42 (1.67) Seller[5]: -0.08 (0.36)
Seller[6]: 0.55 (0.60) Seller[6]; 0.46* (0.41) Seller[6]: -0.09 (0.24)
Efflciencv: 99.81 (0.02) Efficiencv: 96.30 iO.05) Efficiency: 99.88 (0.06)
MP StdDev MP StdDev MP StdDev
Relative
All Buyers: .0.22« (0.12) • All Buyers: -0.13* (0.10) All Buyers: 0.13 (0.33)
All Sellers: 0.80* (0.53) All Sellers: 0.28 (0.35) All Sellers: -0.10 (0.26)
Concentration
Buyer[l): 0.13 (0.33)Buyer[l]; -0.21* (0.11) Buyerll]: -O.ll* (0.10)
Buyer[2]: -0.31 (0.44) Buyer[2]: -0.80* (0.40) Buyer[2]: ZP (0.00)
1 Buyer[3I: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00)
Buyer(3]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[I]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: -0.37 (1.89) Seller[2]: -0.10 (0.34)
Seller[3]: 0.76* (0.63) Seller[3]: 0.34 (0.45) Seller[3]: -0.11 (0.24)
Efficiencv; 92.13 (0.09) Efficiencv: 94.59 (0.07) . Efficiency: 100.00 (0.00)
MP StdDev MP StdDev MP StdDev
All Buyers: -0.21* (0.12) All Buyers: -0.14* (0.08) All Buyers: 0.09 (0.24)
All Sellers: 0.67* (0.46) All Seller: 0.30 (0.31) All Sellers: -0.07 (0.19)
Buyer[l]; -0.18* (0.12) Buyer[l]: -0.14* (0.10) Buyer[l]; 0.09 (0.27)
Buyer[2]: -0.37 (0.47) Buyer[2]: -0.77* (0.44) Buyer[2]: ZP (0.00)
1/2 Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3J: ZP
(0.00)
Buyer[4]: -0.20* (0.11) Buyer[4]: -0.11 (0.11) BuyerI4]; 0.10 (0.25)
Buyer[5]: -0.38 (0.47) Buyer[5]: -0.73* (0.46) Buyer[5j: ZP (0.00)
Buyer[6]: ZP (0.00) Buyerl6]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[6]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[ll: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Se]ler[ll: ZP (0.00)
Seller[2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: 0.14 (2.69) Seller[2]: -0.08 (0.27)
•Seller[3]: 0.63* (0.55) Seiler[3]: 0.32 (0.48) SeUer[3]: -0.07 (0.17)
ESlciencv: 91.84 (0.09) Efficiencv: 94.24 (0.07) Efficiencv: 100.00 (0.00)
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-TABLEVII ; , r
ANALYTICALLY DERIVED STRUCTUI^MARKET POWER OUTCOMES
Relative .
Concentration
1/2
1/2,
All Buyers: -0.14
All Sellers: 0.56
.Buyer[lJ: -0.43
SeUer(3]: 1.67
SeIlerI6]: 1.67
All Others: 0.00
All Buyers:
All Sellers:
Buyer[l]:
Seller[3]:
All Others;
All Buyers:
All Sellers:
Buyer[l]:
Buyer[4]:
SeHer[3];
All Others:
-0.14
0.56
-0.43
1.67
0.00
-0.14
0.56
-0.43
-0.43
1.67
, 0.00
Relative Capacity
1
.All Buyers:
All Sellers;
Buyer[l]:
Sellerp]:-
Seller[6):
All Others:
•0.12
0.45
-0.37
1.36
1.36
0.00
All Buyers; -0.12
All SeUers: 0.45
Buyer(l]:
Seller[3]:
All Others;
All Buyers:
All Sellers:
Buyer[l]:
Buyer[4]:
Seller(3]:
All Others:
25
-0.37
1.36
0.00
-0.12
0.45
-0.37
-0.37
1.36
0.00
All Buyers: 0.04
All Sellers: -0.05"
Buyer[l]:
Seller[31:
Seller[6]:
All Others:
0.12
-0.16
•0.16
0.00
All Buyers: 0.04
All Sellers: -0.05
Buyer[l]:
SelierI3]:
AirOthers:
All Buyers;
All SeUers:
Buyer[l]:
Buyer[4]:
Seller[3];
All Others:
0.12
-0.16
0.00
0.04
-0.05
0.12
0.12
-0.16
0.00
TABLE VIII
EXPERIMENTALLY DETERMINEDMARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCY OUTCOMES
WITH GASOCIAL LEARNING FROM NICOLAISENETAL. [23]. ZPINDICATES THAT ZERO PROFITS
WERE EARNED BOTH IN THE AUCTIONAND IN COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM.
Relative Capacity
1/2 1 2
MP StdDev MP StdDev MP StdDev
All Buyers:-0.53* (0.35) All Buyers: -0.50* (0.39) All Buyers; -0.37 (0.57)
All Sellers: 0.19 (1.04) All Sellers: 0.19 (1.02) All Sellers: -0.43 (0.54)
Buyer[l]: -0.52* (0.36) Buyer[l]: -0.49* (0.40) Buyer[l]: -0.37 (0.57)
BuyCT[2]: -0.63* (0.62) Buyer[2]: -0.99* (0.09) Buyer[2 ]: ZP (0.00)
2 Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer(3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3]: ZP (0.00)
Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00)
SellerI2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: -0.72 (1.89) Seller[2]: -0.44 (0.65)
Seller[3]: -0.12 (1.47) Seller[3]: 0.30 (1.12) SeIIer[3]: -0.42 (0.50)
Seller[4): ZP (0.00) Seller[4]: ZP (0.00) Seller[4]; ZP (0.00)
Seller[5i: ZP (0.00) Seller[5]: ZP (0.00) Seller[5]: -0.44 (0.66)
SeUer[6]: 0.50 (1.84) Seller[6]: 0.27 (1.12) Seller[6]: -0.41 (0.51)
Efficiency: 60.50 Efficiency: 65.33 Efficiency: 59.68
MP StdDev MP StdDev MP StdDev
All Buyers: -0.66* (0.29) All Buyers: -0.60* (0.34) All Buyers: -0.44 (0.57)
Relative All Sellers: 0.25» (1.13) All Sellers: 0.24 (1.12) All Sellers: -0.50* (0.49)
Concentration
Buyer[l]: -0.63* (0.32) Buyer[l]: .0.59* (0.35) Buyer[l]: -0.44 (0.57)
Buyer(2]: -0.90' (0.35) Buyer[2]: •1.00 (0.00) Buyer[2]: ZP (0.00)
1 BuyerI3]: ZP
(0.00) BuyerI3]: ZP (0.00) Buyer[3): ZP (0.00)
Seller[ll: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) SeIler[II:' ZP (0.00)
Seller[2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: -0.20 (3.30) Seller[2]: -0.52 (0.58)
Seller^]: 0.19* (1.17) Seller[3]: 0.28 (1.26) Sel]er[3]: -0.48 (0.49)
Efficiency: 51.06 Efficiency: 58.67 Efficiency: 52.68
MP StdDev MP StdDev MP StdDev
All Buyers: -0.59* (0.28) All Buyers: -0.53* (0.32) All Buyers: -0.30 (0.54)
All Sellers: 0.71 (1.15) All Sellers: 0.67 (1.12) All Sellers: -0.30 (0.44)
Buyer[l]: -0.55* (0.30) Buyer[l]: -0.51" (0.32) Buyer[l]: -0.31 (0.58)
BuycrI2]: -0.83* (0.46) BuyeTl21: -1.00 (0.00) Buyer(2]: ZP (0.00)
1/2 Buyer[3): ZP (0.00) Buyer[31: ZP
(0.00) Buyer(3]: ZP (0.00)
1.1 ^
Buyer[4): -0.56* (0.29) Buyer(4): -0.52* (0.32) BuyeT[4]: -0.30 (0.56)
Buyer[5}: -0.79* (0.50) Buyer[5]: -1.00 (0.00) Buyer[5]: ZP (0.00)
Buyer[61: ZP (0.00) Buyer[61: ZP (0.00) Buyer(6]; ZP (0.00)
Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00) Seller[l]: ZP (0.00)
SellerI2]: ZP (0.00) Seller[2]: 0.05 (4.53) Seller[21: -0.38 (0.57)
Seller[3]: 0.70 (1.17) Seller(3]: 0.73 (1.29) SellerI3]: -0.24 (0.48)
Efficiency: 65.38 Efficiency: 73.67 Efficiency: 70.00
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